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ABSTRACT  Consumption is not often addressed in the literature on social movements even 
though consumer organizations and consumer tactics have been successful in achieving 
social change. This paper offers an analytical framework for studying the politics of 
consumption, which suggests that consumers can be conceived of collectively as active 
agents rather than passive individuals. I capture this active agency through four concepts: 
mobilization, problematization, identification, and contention. I focus on one consumer 
organization, the National Consumers’ League, and its three consumer tactics, white 
lists, white labels, and legislation, in order to demonstrate how the analytical framework I 
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Why has consumption been understood economically as a private act by self-
interested individuals rather than politically as a site for collective action? Is it possible 
for consumers to organize their purchasing power as a means to achieve social justice? 
If so, what kinds of tactics could be used to mobilize consumers? This study hopes to 
provide insight into such questions by examining the various ways the National 
Consumers’ League (NCL) politicized consumption during the Progressive Era. 
 
In this study I argue that four related sets of practices constitute what I call the 
politics of consumption: mobilization, problematization, identification, and contention. 
Specifically, I will demonstrate how the consumer tactics of the NCL were embedded 
in each of these practices. The NCL employed three consumer tactics to promote its 
interests and goals: lists, labels, and legislation. In the following paper I will discuss the 
role these tactics played in the mobilization efforts of the NCL and how these tactics 
were used by it to problematize consumption and identify consumers. I will also discuss 




The Politics of Consumption: An Analytical Framework   
 
I argue in this study that the relationship between consumption and collective action, 
or what I call the politics of consumption, can be best understood through four 
practices: mobilization, problematization, identification, and contention. These four 
practices, or ‘organized way[s] of doing things’ (Dean, 1999, p. 18), can be used to 
understand not only how the activity of consumption became politicized through collective 
action, but can also be applied to understand how other forms of social activity become 
politicized as well. This analytical framework incorporates several theoretical 
contributions made by comparative and political sociologists. I suggest that the synthesis 
of these theories offers a richer understanding of collective action than is currently 
proposed in the social movement literature. 
 
Three core concepts compose the prevailing analytical framework in the current 
literature on social movements: political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing 
processes. In practice each concept tends to be used in order to explain different levels 
of analysis. For example, the concept of political opportunity is used to explain how 
social movements  are  constrained  and  enabled  by  macro-level  structures,  
particularly  the state (Skocpol, 1992; Tarrow, 1998). At the meso-level, mobilizing 
structures     such as organizational forms, goals, tactics, and networks     are used to 
explain how social movements shape collective action. A variety of framing processes, 
or cognitive schema that ‘organize experience and guide action’ (Snow et al., 1986, p. 
464) are used to explain micro-level phenomenon, such as how collective 
understandings of the world are meaningfully constructed and maintained (Benford & 
Snow, 1992). 
 
Although several theorists of social movements, such as McAdam, McCarthy, and 
Zald (1996, p. 7), have proposed that a synthesis of these concepts is needed to fully 
explain social movements, few scholars seem willing to take on this challenge. One can 
surmise that this challenge has been avoided because it would be a burdensome 
endeavor to demonstrate how all levels of analysis interact with one another. But it 
seems more plausible that this avoidance may be the result of an over-reliance on each 
concept in the current literature. According to a recent book by Doug McAdam, Sidney 
Tarrow, and Charles Tilly (2001) political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and 
framing are static concepts and have become merely ‘checklist variables’. Each concept 
has been used and defined in such a variety of ways that they are beginning to lose their 
analytical fruitfulness and explanatory power. Gamson and Meyer (1996, p. 275) claim 
that the concept of political opportunities has been ‘used to explain so much, it may 
ultimately explain nothing at all’; framing processes and mobilizing structures have 
suffered a similar fate. Furthermore, these concepts have been used to explain why social 
movements occur rather than understand the intricate processes of how collective 
action is accomplished. McAdams, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001) claim that these concepts 
are neither ‘relational’ nor ‘dynamic’ and fail to interact with each other in such a way as 
to form a level of understanding of the processes involved in social movements. 
 
While the analytical framework offered in this study hopes to advance social 
movement theory, it is, to a certain degree, compatible with the existing concepts 
predominantly used in this field. Although I do not subscribe to the notion that political 
opportunities structurally condition the existence of social movements, I do believe that 
political opportunities make a difference in enabling or constraining collective action in 
so much that movement actors recognize and subsequently take advantage of them. 
Furthermore, I agree that access to state institutions and actors makes a difference in 
the actions of social movements, particularly in terms of alliance building, but this 
access tends to be more complex than is currently portrayed. For example, just 
because most women did not have the right to vote in most states does not mean that 
they were structurally denied access to the state. Many women, especially elite 
women, actively worked to create positions for themselves within current state 
institutions, and even built new state organizations, such as the Children’s Bureau 
(Baker, 1984; Muncy, 1991; Sklar, 1995b; Skocpol, 1992). Elite women, particularly 
those in the NCL, were also closely allied with powerful male state actors and used 
these personal networks for support to advance their causes (Storrs, 2000). Thus, to 
claim that women were structurally positioned ‘outside’ of the state because most were 
denied the right to vote does not fully capture their involvement with political activities. 
Furthermore, the equation of politics to the state, or ‘institutionalized politics’, as 
implied by the concept of ‘political opportunity’ does not explore activities occurring 
beyond the scope of the state, such as the marketplace interactions, as political. 
Politics, and power more generally, operate at other levels than merely those forms that 
are institutionalized. Political action may be organized to intentionally pressure the 
state to change its policies, but at the same time it also changes the practices of 
citizens. Political action may even exclusively focus on changing the conduct of 
citizens. In Foucauldian language this means that those who ‘govern’ are not 
exclusively state actors and that the practice of ‘governing’ can be directed at shaping 
conduct other than that connected to institutionalized politics. 
 
I adopt the concept of mobilizing structures as ‘those collective vehicles, informal as 
well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action’ (McAdam 
et al., 1996, p. 3), but I focus less on the resource mobilization theory that has 
informed this concept and more on the role of tactics. I specifically discuss how the 
NCL devised specific tactics, which shaped its configuration and influenced its ability 
to realize its interests and goals. 
 
While the modified versions of the concepts of political opportunities and mobilizing 
structures I describe above resemble what I call ‘contention’ and ‘mobilization’ in my 
analytical framework, the concept of framing is captured by two practices: 
problematization and identification. The idea of framing and the importance of 
culture are more recent innovations in the social movement literature than political 
opportunities and mobilizing structures and the way that framing and culture are used 
in practice is not as fully developed. Overwhelmingly, framing is defined as culture or 
‘the shared meanings and definitions that people bring to their situation’ (McAdam et 
al., 1996, p. 6). There are several implications behind framing. First is that collective 
actors are conscious of their shared meanings of the world and that they 
intentionally act on these meanings. This subjective understanding of culture is not 
necessarily problematic, but as Pierre Bourdieu (1984) has demonstrated with his 
concept of ‘habitus’, in practice social actors are not always self-consciously aware of 
how they structure the social world. Sewell (1992) expresses a similar idea through his 
notion of ‘schema’    although a subjective level exists in how social actors interpret 
their everyday lives, there also exists objective rules of conduct that they follow in 
expressing the meaning of their actions. In this sense it is difficult to assume that 
culture is simply ‘out there’ as a bundled ‘tool kit’ for social actors to use instrumentally 
at will (see Swidler, 1986). The second implication of framing is that people ‘have’ 
identities, whether they are defined as class, gender, or race. This does not address 
the process of identity-making     or even tell us why identity is important in the first 
place. I suggest that studying the practices of collective actors can bridge this 
subjective-objective divide and better help us to comprehend how they understand 
themselves and their actions. I use the concept of problematization to capture the 
process of how collective actors articulate their interests and goals     and make 
meaning. The concept of identification is used in this study to discuss how collective 
actors use certain social categories to build ‘collective self-understandings’ 
(Brubaker & Cooper, 2000, p. 16)     and in the process make real social categories 
like class or gender. 
 
The analytical framework in this study seeks to contribute an alternative way to 
understand collective action, particularly through how social practices, such as 
consumption, become politicized. There are several potential benefits in using the 
relationship between mobilization, problematization, identification, and contention to 
study collective action. First, it avoids reproducing what are becoming ambiguous 
concepts in the social movement literature. Second, it addresses processes rather 
than the causes and effects of collective action, which means that it attempts to 
account for answering questions about how, rather than why, collective actors 
politicize social practices. The four practices developed in this study are relational and 
dynamic; together they constitute the process of how consumption became politicized 
by a social movement. Third, it provides a useful framework for studying social 
movements, like the NCL, which are not ‘revolutionary’ or attempting to eradicate an 
entire regime of power, but are rather trying to reform or change specific practices 
within such a regime. The NCL did not struggle to overthrow the American state 
or capitalist economy. Instead it hoped to reform specific practices of each, while 
preserving the fundamental foundations of the status quo. Finally, the analytical 
framework offered here brings together the ideas of several innovative social 
theorists, and has the potential for advancing a theory of collective action sensitive to 
the historical comparative methods used in this study. In the following paragraphs I 
define the four practices that compose the analytical framework in this study and 
highlight how each builds on existing theoretical work. Although I discuss each of 





The practice of mobilization refers to how collective actors devise tactics to promote 
their interests and goals. These tactics are a form of what James Jaspers (1997, p. 
44) calls ‘strategic interaction’ and the interests and goals voiced with them may be 
instrumental or rational or they may be moral or altruistic    either way they are ‘efforts 
to transform the social world’. The fact that tactics are ‘interactive’ suggests that they 
do not arise out of thin air, but from social-historical contexts. For example, a tactic 
may be created by collective actors because of constrained political opportunity 
structures. Tactics are also interactive in that collective actors may borrow or imitate 
what they interpret as successful tactics from other collective actors. Tactics are even 
interactive in the sense that when employed by collective actors they might be used 
together simultaneously to reinforce their effectiveness. Finally, tactics are interactive 
because they are dynamic. McAdam (1983, p. 736) argues that the process of 
‘tactical interaction’ is an ongoing process in which collective actors devise or innovate 
new tactical forms, which opponents attempt to neutralize and tactically adapt. 
According to McAdam, ‘how well each succeeds at this task crucially effects the pace 
and outcome of insurgency’ (ibid., p. 736). 
 
Thus, tactical interaction affects the mobilization efforts of collective actors (Meyer, 
2004). First, it was through tactics that the NCL was able to make concrete the 
articulation of their grievances, or how they problematized consumption. Second, the 
NCL identified consumers with these tactics, thus made evident the potential 
participants or constituencies they were attempting to mobilize. Finally, the contention 
the NCL faced centered on its consumer tactics as they were the visible 




White Lists and Labels 
 
       During the winter of 1889 members of the Working Women’s Society investigated 
the employment conditions of female sales clerks in several New York City department 
stores. Their findings, which included unsanitary working conditions and excessively 
long working hours, were presented at a public meeting in the spring of 1890. Several 
affluent and influential women attended this meeting. Horrified to hear of the 
sufferings endured by working women, they organized a committee to create a list of 
stores where female employees were treated fairly. This list was intended to ‘keep 
shoppers informed of such shops that deal justly and fairly with the employees and so 
bring public opinion and public action to bear in favor of just employers’. This 
committee came to be called the ‘Consumers’ League’, and its purpose was to help 
female workers through enlisting the support of consumers (Nathan, 1926, pp. 21  
23). 
 
     The Consumers’ League list would be complemented by a white label when 
several local and state leagues organized into the NCL in 1899. As I discuss in this 
section, lists and labels were the organizational impetus for the Consumers’ League and 
the NCL. Thus, lists and labels matter because they provided the key in the 
consolidation of the NCL. The NCL, in particular, gained a powerful ‘voice’ through its 
list and label tactics, which it built upon in its attempt to mobilize consumers through a 
third tactic: legislation (Dirks, 1996, p. 82). Lists and labels were also important 
because they were innovative tactics targeted at the conduct of consumers and the 
practices of consumption in the interests of workers’ rights. The NCL employed lists 
and tactics to mobilize the purchasing power of consumers at the point of consumption 
in an attempt to ameliorate social injustices at the point of production. 
 
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the origin of what eventually became 
the NCL was a response to the idea of creating a list of manufacturers who treated 
their employees fairly. When the first consumers’ league was organized in 1891 in New 
York City its founding members, Josephine Shaw Lowell and Maud Frederick Nathan, 
established the tactic of the white list. A white list differed in method from the blacklist 
(Glickman, 1997) because recommended fair merchants for consumers to support 
rather than prohibiting consumers from purchasing goods from unfair firms.2 The first 
Consumers’ League campaign was to mobilize consumers to help improve the working 
conditions of female sales clerks; therefore its white list was targeted at merchants or 
retailers instead of manufacturers. The Consumers’ League paid to publish the white list 
periodically in daily newspapers and in pamphlet form to its members (Nathan, 1926, p. 
26). 
 
Before implementing its white list the Consumers’ League decided the specific 
standards a merchant or retailer had to meet in order to operate ‘fair house’. These 
standards were strict attempts to regulate the wages, working hours, and working 
conditions of employees. A fair house was required to pay male and female employees 
equal wages of at least six dollars per week and compensate all overtime work. It was 
prohibited from employing children under the age of 14. Fair employers could only keep 
their stores open between the hours of 8 a.m. and 6 p.m., and had to allow employees at 
least 45 minutes for a lunch break. During the summer months a fair house was also 
required to give a half-holiday on one day each week and provide at least one week of 
paid vacation. Seats needed to be provided for female sales clerks. Furthermore, 
separate work, lunch, and rest rooms had to be established and fair houses had to obey 
existing sanitary and labor laws (Nathan, 1926, pp. 267). The League managed to 
convince eight stores to conform to its fair-house rules and published these on its first 
white list in 1891 (the most recognized store today included on this list is Lord & 
Taylor). By 1893 the list grew three-fold to include the names of 24 stores (Nathan, 
1926, pp. 28  9, p. 32) and increased to 41 stores in 1898 (Dirks, 1996, p. 96). 
 
The Consumers’ League did not feel that its white list would result in animosity on 
the part of merchants or retailers. In fact, the League expressed in its constitution that 
‘the majority of employers are virtually helpless to improve conditions as to hours and 
wages unless sustained by public opinion, by law, and by the action of consumers’ 
(Nathan, 1926, p. 25). But, according to Nathan, merchants did, in fact, resent the 
white list and the League’s attempt to change the purchasing conduct of shoppers, 
even though they did not take either threat very seriously and ‘pooh-poohed the 
absurd attempts of a handful of “busybodies”’ (Nathan, 1926, p. 30). As the white list 
and work of the League expanded Nathan reports that a ‘competitive jealousy’ was 
aroused every time the League added a new name to its white list; stores began 
contacting the League to discuss how they too could be listed. Being added to the white 
list cost the stores no money and could be used as a form of free advertisement, 
especially because it was published in widely circulated newspapers. 
 
The white list continued to be used as a tactic to mobilize consumers after the 
various state consumers’ leagues organized into the NCL in 1899, but it was 
surpassed at the national level by the creation of a white label (Sklar, 1998). The NCL 
rarely mentioned work on the white list at its annual conventions. Local and state 
leagues accounted for almost all of the work on the white list tactic, and at the NCL’s 
10th annual meeting it called on more of its affiliates to create white lists directed at 
mobilizing consumers at the local level. 
 
State and local leagues were also decisive in the creation of what came to be called 
the white label. The impetus to create a central organization, after all, came from 
individual leagues, which decided that a label campaign, similar to the American 
Federation of Labor’s (AFL) union label (Glickman, 1997; Wiedenhoft, 2006), 
depended upon the coordination of a national organization. In 1898 Nathan suggested 
the creation of a Consumers’ League label in a reply to criticisms of the union label 
that appeared in the North American Review (Nichols, 1897). According to Nathan 
what was needed was: 
 
a label which will not arbitrarily exact that the workers should belong to labor 
organizations, but which would insure to the purchaser: 1st. Sanitary conditions in 
production; 2d. A living wage to the producer; 3d. Good workmanship; 4th. The 
endorsement of the Factory Inspector; and 5th, the option of its use by all 
manufacturers who can prove that they fulfil the necessary conditions. (1898, p. 251) 
 
At this point in time Nathan proposed that state factory inspectors would award the use 
of such a label, not individual consumers’ leagues. John Graham Brooks, president 
of then Massachusetts Consumers’ League and the first president of the NCL, likewise 
suggested in an 1898 report on the union label for the Department of Labor, that public 
demand was growing for a label that would be ‘an absolute guarantee that the goods 
upon which it is placed are not made in sweat shops’ (Brooks, 1898, p. 215). While 
Brooks claimed that he had initially envisioned the League simply adopting the union 
label, early investigations found its members were not likely to consume union-made 
products and that allying itself too closely to the AFL ‘would have killed the movement 
from the start’ because it would have forced all manufacturers using the League’s label 
to unionize their shops. Therefore, Brooks concluded that a National Consumers’ 
League would have to create its own label (1900, p. 252). 
 
The NCL’s label campaign differed in several ways from its white list tactic. First, the 
label was directed at manufacturers, not merchants or retailers as its white list was. 
This made the methods associated with the label different than those with the white list 
where members could personally observe the working conditions of department stores or 
ask sales clerks about their working hours and wages. NCL members did not work directly 
in factories and therefore had less access on the day-to-day working conditions within 
the factories awarded its label. Second, the NCL’s label campaign was centralized. 
Rather than having individual consumers’ leagues create their own labels, the NCL 
issued one, uniform label. The NCL label claimed that the product to which it was 
attached was ‘made under clean and healthful conditions’ and that ‘use of the label’ was 
‘authorized after investigation’. Instead of placing this label on a variety of products it 
was only placed on one: women’s and children’s undergarments (thus, the connotation 
of the ‘white’ label). This choice of product was intentional as the garment industry was 
notorious for employing unskilled, young women and was the main industry 
responsible for sweatshop production (Boris, 1994). Furthermore, these garment 
workers were not unionized. Therefore the NCL label would not compete directly with the 
union labels of organized labor. Third, the standards for awarding a manufacturer use of 
the white label differed from those of the white list. The white label required that 
manufacturers meet the following demands: 
 
1. the goods bearing the label were made in factories that obeyed State factory laws 
2. the goods were fully assembled in the factory (and not in a sweatshop) 
3. no overtime was worked at the factory 
4. no child under the age of seventeen was employed by the factory 
 
Furthermore, before the NCL allowed a manufacturer to use its label, a member of the 
league had to personally inspect the factory and also obtain a report from the local or 
state Board of Health to certify the working conditions of the establishment. Finally, 
the NCL’s initial white label standards did not require manufacturers to pay a specified 
wage. 
 
The high standards of the NCL label made it a difficult mobilizing tactic since so few 
manufacturers ever met all of the NCL requirements, particularly regarding 
overtime. Additionally, the stipulation that manufacturers obey state health and factory 
laws resulted in an uneven use of the label throughout the country. For example, 
an overwhelming number of manufacturers using the label were located in 
Massachusetts because it was a state that had not only passed regulatory labor laws, 
but also enforced them. At the end of the first year of the NCL’s label campaign in 
1900, 13 factories were using the label. The use of the label by manufacturers grew to 
62 by 1904. However, the number of factories using the label did not grow 
significantly beyond this number and by 1916 only 68 manufacturers were awarded 
the NCL label (NCL, 1917). 
The NCL was not hindered by the small scope of its label campaign and refused to 
lower the standards of its label in order to broaden this mobilizing tactic. In fact, debate 
surrounding the use of the label focused on ways to increase its rigor. From its inception 
the label had been criticized because it lacked a wage requirement like the white list or the 
union label. At its annual meeting in 1909 the NCL resolved to begin investigating the 
standard of living among self-supporting, working women in order to construct a 
minimum wage standard that could be applied to its label campaign (NCL, 1907, pp. 11  
13). After a lengthy investigation the League decided against adopting a wage standard for 
its label, but in 1913 the NCL did pass two additional requirements for issuing its label. 
Manufacturers using the label now had to limit its employees’ working hours to 55 per 
week and agree to allow NCL members to inspect its payroll. These stricter standards 
resulted in the loss of some of the League’s ‘recommended factories and the necessary 
refusal to accept many more’ (NCL, 1913, p. 29). After the Triangle Fire at a New York 
City garment factory in 1911 the League proposed that manufacturers using the label 
must also meet fire safety regulations. In 1916 the NCL issued the most radical of all its 
label standards: the termination of the label contract of any manufacturer whose 
employees were on strike. The decision to adopt this standard was evenly divided 
among NCL members. Although many NCL participants were sympathetic towards trade 
unions and the labor movement, many were opposed to strikes (NCL, 1917, p. 29). 
While it is conceivable that this strike clause would have meant the ultimate demise of 
the NCL label, as manufacturers would have most certainly found it antagonistic from an 
organization, which, up to this point, they had been on relatively friendly terms with, it 
was actually the AFL that determined the fate of the NCL label campaign as I discuss 
in the following pages. 
 
 
The Legislative Turn 
 
Even during the NCL’s label campaign, the tactic of legislation occupied a pivotal 
position in the work of many league participants. This can be read in the dismay of the 
NCL’s Label Committee chairwomen: ‘Is the legislation without exceptions, advocated 
by our members, really more stable than the policy of this committee?’ (NCL, 1917, p. 
20). The answer to this question was unequivocally ‘yes’. League members had used 
their status as consumers to work on securing and enforcing labor laws from the creation 
of the very first consumers’ league in New York City in 1891. Investigative testimony 
from members of the New York City Consumers’ League to the New York Senate 
was fundamental in securing the passage of the 1896 Mercantile Inspection Act. This 
act limited the working hours of women under 21 years old and boys under the age of 16 
to 60 hour per week, and fixed their workday from between the hours of 7 a.m. and 10 
p.m. Children under the age of 14 were prohibited from employment. The act also 
required mercantile establishments to provide employees with separate rooms for rest 
and lunch, and that they place one seat for every three female sales clerks behind 
counters. The New York Department of Health was responsible for the enforcement of 
this act, and in 1902 Maud Nathan, president of the Consumers’ League of New York 
City, was appointed as a special inspector to this (Nathan, 1926, p. 51).3 
 
   One indication of when the NCL began concentrating much of its energy on 
legislation is the addition of the following clause to its constitution in 1905: ‘[The 
NCL] further proposes to promote legislation, either state or federal, whenever it may 
appear expedient’ (NCL, 1905, p. 3). The clause was created in conjunction with the 
League’s decision to begin investigating food production and preparation in order to 
assist other organizations, like the General Federation of Women’s Club, in their 
struggle to pass the Pure Food and Drug Act. Another indication of the League’s growing 
interest in promoting its legislative tactic was the amendment of its constitution at its 
ninth annual meeting in 1908. At this meeting the NCL expanded the title of its 
Committee on Legislation to the ‘Committee on Legislation and on Legal Defense of 
Labor Laws’ and added that it would ‘assist in the defense of the laws by supplying 
additional legal counsel or other assistance’ (NCL, 1909, p. 13). This organizational 
action was, no doubt, supported by the NCL’s successful defense of a law regulating 
women’s working hours in the 1908 Supreme Court case Muller v. Oregon. A further 
move towards legislation occurred at the NCL’s 10th annual meeting when Kelley 
reported that the label tactic was not sufficiently solving the problem of sweatshop 
production and suggested that the League work to secure legislation to prohibit 
sweatshops (NCL, 1909, p. 16). 
 
It is important to note that the NCL did not abandon its list or label tactics when it 
began fighting for state regulation of labor laws. Indeed, at the same session that 
Kelley advocated working on legislation to prohibit sweatshops, the League also 
highlighted the importance of its white list and called for all local leagues to create one 
(NCL, 1909, p. 28). Furthermore, the NCL established a ‘Label Shop’ in New York City 
on 4 February 1911 (NCL, 1911, p. 23). But, as the League began concentrating more 
of its energy on securing legislation to protect women and child workers, the actual 
purposes of the white list and label became, to a certain degree, obsolete. For 
example, when the NCL succeeded in passing legislation that prohibited child labor in 
certain states, it no longer needed its list or label to guarantee this. 
 
The League’s focus on legislation did change the practice of mobilizing 
consumers. While the list and label tactics took place at the point of consumption, its 
legislative tactic took place at the site of the state. This turned the NCL into a lobbying 
association and made consumers not only a third party in economic transactions 
between employers and employees, but also a ‘third estate’ in government labor 
regulations (Lynd, 1936). The NCL’s move from lists and label tactics to legislative 
tactics was not a unique pattern of action among women’s reform organizations at the 
time. The General Federation of Women’s Club and Woman’s Christian Temperance 
Union also followed a similar trajectory from moral reform to lobbying. The NCL was 
different from these other organizations in that it connected moral reform to economic 
action, but it was similar in that its ‘initial forays into the public realm served as a 
forward position from which women could redeploy their organizations for political 
ends’ (Clemens, 1997, p. 189; see Sklar, 1995a, 1995b). The NCL was able to build 






The concept of problematization is used in this study in the Foucauldian sense as a ‘a 
way of questioning and interrogating past, present, and potential alternatives’ (Dean, 
1999, p. 210). Although problematization is most frequently used to understand 
practices of governing, particularly of the  state  (Dean, 1999; Murphy, 2001), I use 
the  concept to  understand  the  practices  of  collective  action.  According  to  Dean  
(1999,  p.  27) ‘a problematization of government is a calling into question of how we 
shape or direct our own and others’ conduct’. While both Foucault and Dean 
understand ‘governing’ as a practice of authority, neither view the state as the sole 
site of this power. Government, professionals,  parents  and  corporate  entities  can  
also  ‘govern’  the  conduct  of  the ‘governed’, such as patients, children and 
consumers. Furthermore, the line between the governing and the governed may be 
ambiguous (Dean, 1999, p. 27). Social movements, in particular, seem to be 
characterized by this ambiguous relationship; collective actors, as the governed, 
problematize and question the conduct of those who govern and often form in 
opposition to the practices of government. But, at the same time collective actors also 
govern by problematizing and attempting to shape the conduct of those they mobilize, 
such as disciplining the purchasing power of consumers. 
 
 
A critical component of problematization is the articulation of interests, goals, and 
grievances. In other words, collective actors construct their agendas according to how 
they problematize or question the conduct surrounding a particular social 
phenomenon. The NCL problematized consumption in terms of production and 
understood consumption as a means to change production. In other words, it was not 
the act of consumption per se that was considered harmful, but certain types of 
consumer conduct which perpetuated the exploitation of workers, such as shopping 
late at night or buying sales items made in sweatshops. The NCL understood 
consumption as more than a simple end of production it could, indeed, be the means to 
change production. The NCL argued that it was ‘the duty of consumers to find out under 
what conditions the articles they purchase are produced and distributed’ and ’insist that 
these conditions shall be wholesome and consistent with a respectable existence on 
the part of the worker (NCL, 1903, p. 3). 
 
By introducing the idea of consumption as a means the NCL was able to make 
political an otherwise purely economic activity. The NCL did not construct its agenda 
around issues that concerned the interests of consumers, such as lowering prices or 
improving the quality of consumer goods, but rather around issues that promoted the 
interests of workers. Four grievances, in particular, that the NCL used its consumer 
tactics to try to ameliorate were long working hours, child labor, unsanitary working 
conditions and low wages. Interestingly, all of these grievances can be captured in 
the ‘master frame’ (Snow & Benford, 1992) of the maternalism of elite women to help 




On Behalf of Working  Women and Children: Cross-class Maternalism 
 
The NCL problematized excessive working hours as threatening to the health of 
female workers. Female workers needed shorter workdays and summer vacations not 
to enjoy novels or to learn to appreciate art, but to physically relax and recuperate. 
Female workers also needed leisure time so that they could properly perform their 
duties as mothers. Long days of toil meant that mothers could not nurture and 
supervise their children. The NCL even argued that long working hours could lower 
the fertility of women, threatening the social role that women were most cherished in 
fulfilling (Brandeis & Goldmark, 1969). The NCL used these connections between 
women, work, and health when it presented its case for the legal restriction of 
women’s working hours before the Supreme Court. 
 
Compared to the issue of wages, finding ways to decrease the working hours of 
women, particularly salesclerks, was a more feasible endeavor for consumers to control 
directly. It was, after all, possible for consumers to voluntarily regulate their own 
shopping hours. If consumers refused to shop after 6 p.m., then stores would be 
forced to close early in the evening due to a lack of business and the sales clerk’s 
workday would end at 6 p.m. instead of 10 p.m. Consumers could also plan their 
shopping habits more efficiently to put less stress and strain on workers. The NCL 
urged consumers not to place ‘rush’ orders because they resulted in forced overtime 
during times of great demand, and forced idleness during slack periods (see Benson, 
1986). 
 
The NCL articulated its grievances against child labor similar to the way it 
problematized long working hours for women.4 The health and moral character of 
children were compromised if they worked for wages, whether in the factory or in the 
tenement house. The League was particularly adamant that children be prohibited 
from working at night. According to the NCL night work predisposed boys and girls to 
dependence upon stimulants and narcotics, nervous breakdowns, and tuberculosis. 
Young girls who worked at night as telephone operators or hotel lobby clerks were 
‘utterly unprotected from the gravest moral dangers’. The NCL argued that night work 
for children was ‘exactly the opposite of training for long life, good health, efficient work 
and self respect’ (NCL, 1909, p. 23). 
 
The problem of child labor figured prominently in all three of the League’s consumer 
tactics. The white list stipulated that merchants could not employ children under the age 
of 14 and the white label could not be awarded to manufacturers who employed 
children under the age of 17. The League also suggested other conduct that 
consumers could engage in to fight child labor at the point of purchase, such as 
requesting adults to deliver their packages from merchants instead of young 
messenger boys (NCL, 1904, p. 22). However, the League promoted its tactic of 
legislation as the only way to permanently abolish child labor. There was a direct 
relationship between the use of the white label and legislation. The lack of child labor 
laws prevented the NCL from enlarging the scope of its label tactic because so many 
manufacturers employed children and, therefore, could not be awarded use of the 
label. If manufacturers were prohibited by law from this production practice, then the 
NCL could potentially strengthen its label tactic (Athey, 1965, p. 121). The League 
cautioned that even if it could secure such protective labor laws, this would not free 
consumers from their moral obligation to shop responsibly. If children continued 
to be employed by merchants and manufacturers the fault lay with consumers: 
 
For no one except the direct employer is so responsible for the fate of these children 
as the purchaser who buy the products of their toil. And no one can so appropriately 
stand guard over the children engaged in stores, streets occupations, and the 
messenger service, insisting upon the enforcement of every statute for their 
protection, as the purchasing public, who are, in these cases, the direct employers of 
the children. (NCL, 1905, p. 13) 
 
The League also stressed that the power of consumers was particularly important in 
states without any child labor regulations, a condition that existed in many 
Southern states. ‘Who,’ asked the League, ‘can name to the purchaser Southern 
cotton mills whose products embody no labor of children?’ (NCL, 1907, p. 26). The 
cotton mills in the South were notorious for employing children, and Southern 
legislators, fearing the flight of Northern capital, opposed all bills to abolish child labor. 
 
Protecting women workers and children was also part of the way that the NCL 
problematized sweatshop or tenement house manufacturing; however it also stressed 
the welfare of consumers in its problematization of this grievance. If consumers 
were not concerned about the welfare of sweatshop workers, perhaps they would be 
appalled into action if they learned that that the clothes or food they purchased could 
be infected with deadly diseases bred in tenement houses. The NCL claimed that it 
had ‘never striven to protect the consuming public at the cost of the workers,’ but 
‘sometime, however, their interest is identical, as in getting rid of tenement housework’ 
(NCL, 1917, p. 18). The NCL stressed that all grades of consumer goods, not just cheap 
ones, were sent to tenements for finishing (NCL, 1900, p. 4). In a series of 
investigations on tenement manufacturing, League member Elizabeth Shepley 
Sergeant found that both cheap, ready-to-wear clothing and expensive, custom-made 
garments were sent to sweatshops for assembly (1910, p. 242). 
 
Similar to the issue of working hours and child labor, the NCL stressed that the 
welfare and health of workers was compromised by tenement house work. The 
League cited a medical report by Dr Annie Daniel, which stated that ‘the word home 
was never intended to apply to such an apartment; neither does it give a description of 
an ideal place in which manufacturing should be done’ (NCL, 1905, p. 26). Like Daniel, 
the NCL was concerned that workers could not maintain a respectable family life if a 
mother was occupied with sewing trousers for 14 hours a day and children were kept 
at home, rather than attending school, to straighten tobacco or dye artificial flowers. 
The health of workers, as well as consumers, was also threatened by sweatshop 
manufacturing because of the possible spread of contagious diseases. According to 
an investigation by League member Mary Sherman, the ‘danger of the spread of 
contagious disease’ was not simply an issue ‘among poor people who are forced to 
buy cheap food in small neighborhoods stores, but to any one buying in the best and 
most expensive stores in the city’ (NCL, 1906, p. 41). 
 
The prohibition of sweatshop or tenement house manufacturing was the 
fundamental aim of the NCL’s white label. The label itself stated that the goods to which 
it was attached were made in ‘clean and healthful conditions’. No manufacturer could 
be awarded use of the label unless the goods he sold were produced entirely at the 
site of his factory right down to every inch of lace or every fake flower sewn onto a 
garment. Though the NCL appealed to consumers to use their purchasing power to 
eradicate sweatshop production, stressing that ‘to buy from the sweatshop is to 
perpetuate sweatshop life and conditions’, the League eventually concluded that only 
legal restrictions could achieve this goal (Brooks, 1900, p. 401).5 
 
The NCL did not problematize consumption in relation to wages, at least initially. 
Although a minimum wage requirement was stipulated for merchants who wanted to 
appear on the League’s white list, it was not a standard for awarding manufacturers use 
of its white label. The League did begin to investigate the cost of living for working 
women in 1907 and found that wages were too low to maintain a decent standard of 
living (see Clark & Wyatt, 1910a, 1910b, 1910c). But, rather than incorporate a wage 
requirement into its white label campaign, the League decided to fight for higher 
wages through what they believed would be a more effective tactic: legislation. At 
the NCL’s 10th annual meeting Kelley explained that findings from the budget 
studies conducted by League members proved that ‘new and more effective ways of 
compelling payment of a living wage’ were necessary. The League determined that 
establishing legal minimum wages boards would be the best solution to the dismally 
low wage compensation of women workers and instituted a Special Committee on 
Minimum Wage Boards in 1909 to begin this legislative battle (Athey, 1965, pp. 176  
177). 
 
Even though the NCL did support higher wages for working women, it is clear that as 
it problematized this grievance it preferred that women not be forced to work for 
wages at all. The League recognized that in some cases women had no choice but 
to work for wages, particularly if their husbands were ill or unemployed. However, it 
believed that it was a regrettable development that most women worked to supplement 
the incomes of their husbands. ‘Why,’ asked Kelley, ‘do we Americans refuse to face 
the fact that women and minors are earning wages primarily because of underpaid 
husbands and fathers, who would gladly keep their wives at home and their children in 
school?’ (1914, pp. 32  33). Indeed, the NCL’s vision of the male breadwinner and 
female homemaker was stereotypical of traditional gender norms of the time, 





In the process of mobilization and problematizing consumption the NCL identified 
the category of ‘the consumer’ as a collective actor. In doing so they proclaimed 
that the routine, seemingly individual act of purchasing a cigar or pair of underwear, 
was, in fact, the consumer’s opportunity to vote for better conditions for workers 
through their wallets and pocketbooks. But, who were the potential participants that 
the NCL attempted to mobilize through its lists, labels, and legislative tactics? 
 
The categories of gender and class played an important role in how the NCL 
identified consumers, but rather than assume that members of each organization simply 
‘had’ gender or class identities I discuss the process of how each constructed and used 
these collective self- understandings. Drawing from the work of Rogers Brubaker and 
Frederick Cooper (2000, p. 17) I use the concept of identification, rather than identity, to 
emphasize a process rather than a condition. The process of identification, according to 
Brubaker and Cooper (ibid., p. 14), ‘invites [one] to specify the agents that do the 
identifying’, whether these agents are those that ‘govern’ or those that are ‘governed’. 
Particularly relevant to this study is what Brubaker and Cooper (ibid., p. 15) call the 
‘categorical mode of identification’, which characterizes the process of how social 
actors ‘identify oneself (or another person) by membership in a class of persons sharing 
some categorical attribute’ such as gender, race, or class. Although they stress that this 
form of identification may ‘build a collective self- understanding’, what is commonly 
referred to as ‘identity’ is not the necessary result (ibid., p. 16). I agree with Brubaker 
and Cooper, which is why I stress how the NCL not only identified ‘the consumer’, but 
also how it categorized the consumer in terms of gender and class. 
 
The NCL primarily identified upper and middle class women as consumers and 
potential  league  participants,  particularly  those  that  were  well  educated    a  social 





     The neglect of working women by organized labor, especially the AFL, is one of the 
primary reasons that the NCL problematized their members own conduct as consumers. 
Even though members of the NCL were overwhelming women, they failed to identify 
working women as consumers, much less working class men. The NCL identified 
middle and upper class women as the primary category of consumer.6 This can be 
seen in its practices, such as the early campaigns of the League that were directed at 
helping sales clerks in the more affluent department stores. It can also be seen in the 
selection of the one product that the NCL 
decided to place its label on: women’s and children’s undergarments. The NCL’s 
consumer tactics were targeted at mobilizing middle and upper class women who were 
free from work to shop in the morning or afternoon, and could afford white labeled 
products and to shop on the stores on the white list. The League stressed that it was the 
responsibility, even the duty, of these middle and upper class women to purchase 
products made under ‘fair and healthful’ working conditions, and become ‘consumer-
citizens’. If women did not have the right to vote in most states they certainly had the 
power to shop for social justice and shape public policy through voting with their purses. 
According to Kelley, those who enjoyed the privilege of voting could only voice their 
position on economic issues once or twice a year, while ‘all of us, all the time, are 
deciding by our expenditures what industries shall survive at all, and under what 
conditions’ (1899, p. 290). 
 
The typical consumer-citizen was reform-minded, well-educated, and often born into 
a family that was financially and politically connected. This is true not only of members 
of the National League, but also of local and state league members. For example, 
Josephine Shaw Lowell, one of the organizers of the first Consumers’ League in New 
York City, was a founding member of the Charity Organization Society of New York 
and was the first woman to serve on the State Board of Charities (Nathan, 1926, p. 
17). Florence Kelley, General Secretary of  the  NCL from  1899  1932 was  the  
daughter of  Congressman William ‘Pig-Iron’ Kelley and grand-niece of the 
abolitionist Sarah Pugh. State league members included the names of Morgan and 
Vanderbilt in New York, Garfield in Ohio, McCormick in Illinois, and Wiley in 
Washington, DC (Vose, 1957, p. 268). Furthermore, school and  college  leagues were 
created  at  elite,  female  institutions  like  Radcliffe, Swarthmore, and Wellesley. 
Perhaps as a result of identifying a largely college-educated constituency,  the  NCL  
attracted  an  overwhelming  number  of  upper  class  women participants compared 
to other women’s organizations of the time (O’Neill, 1971, p. 95). Recruiting women 
who had received a university education provided the NCL with an important resource: 
professional experts experienced in conducting empirical research. These members 
could act as inspectors to guarantee the League’s label tactic. They could also use their 
expertise to support the League’s legislative tactic, including conducting research 
projects, preparing reports, and presenting their findings to government agencies, 
Congress, and, as I discuss in the following section, the Supreme Court. Furthermore, 
they could assist in training other members to perform these duties and even use their 
alumni connections to recruit new League participants. These skills would, according 
to Kelley, encourage its members to ‘look behind the price and appearance of products’ 
and develop their proclivities 
toward becoming ‘better consumers and better citizens’ (NCL, 1904, pp. 17  18). 
 
The way in which it promoted its organization and its mobilization tactics certainly 
helped to reproduce this upper class constituency. For example, in 1902 Kelley 
attended more parlor meetings located in the homes of upper class women (14) than 
meetings of working class men and women (five) (NCL, 1903, p. 35). Furthermore, 
individual consumers’ leagues targeted an upper class constituency by publishing their 
white lists in theater programs and mailing copies of it to the names of individuals 
selected from the Social Register (Dirks, 1996, p. 88). Some New York City League 
members even had the financial resources to turn their parlors into fitting rooms, 
allowing tailors to work in their homes after they had been locked out of a factory 
(Nathan, 1926, pp. 64  65). 
 
The League argued that ‘since the exodus of manufacture from the home’ the ‘one 
great industrial function of women’ was that of purchaser or consumer; therefore it was 
‘very natural that the first effort to educate the great body of miscellaneous 
purchasers’ should be ‘undertaken by women, among women, on behalf of women 
and children’ (Kelley, 1899, pp. 298  299). Obviously, women working for wages 
outside of the home were part of the exodus to the factory, and in the League’s opinion 
they could not fully develop their ‘great industrial function’ as consumers. Thus, the NCL 
failed to identify women working for wages as consumers. From the research gathered 
for this study it is not evident that any working class women were active participants in 
the League. This is surprising considering the fact that the NCL emerged from an 
organization that included working woman called the Working Women’s Society 
(WWS). The first consumers’ league located in New York City stipulated in its 
constitution that women employed in the retail business were to be denied the 
privilege of becoming League members (Nathan, 1926, p. 26). Therefore, even Alice 
Woodbridge, the sales clerk who was the secretary of the WWS and whose 
investigations were an impetus for the creation of the New York City Consumers’ 
League and the white list tactic, was excluded from joining. 
 
According to the NCL’s process of identification, only a certain status of consumer 
middle or upper class could help lower status female and children workers. Consumers 
identified by the NCL did not transcend this class hierarchy and consumers to them 
were understood, for the most part, non-producers. This mode of identification is 
connected to the maternalist perspective from which the NCL problematized 
consumption, and could be viewed as a strategy through which NCL members 
asserted the importance of their economic positions as consumers over producers. 
In other words, by denying working class women the status of consumers the NCL 
failed to include them as participants in a social category that they could potentially 
employ to help themselves, or use to enter the public arena. This restricted the 
available possibilities for working women, who could only seek true social fulfillment 
in their roles as mothers. While working women did enter  the  marketplace  as 
producers, maternalist organizations like  the  NCL deemed unsuccessful their 
efforts at employment. For example, the NCL claimed that: 
 
A body of working-girls between the ages of fourteen and twenty-one years of age 
can neither form stable organizations to defend their own wages and hours of work, 
nor can they influences legislation on their own behalf      they are singularly 
dependent upon the intervention of the purchasing public on their behalf. (NCL, 
1904, p. 9) 
 
Unskilled and unorganized, working women were identified as victims, incapable of 
helping themselves in the marketplace as either producers or consumers.7 
 
The housewives of working class men could have been identified as consumers by 
the League, however, there is no indication that they were enlisted to participate in the 
League in any capacity. Thus, the NCL failed to mobilize the purchasing power of 
the entire working class through its tactics. One may surmise that this may have been 
intentional as the AFL had institutionalized its own consumer tactics, the ‘We Don’t 
Patronize List’ and the union label, to mobilize the working class’s purchasing power 
(see Wiedenhoft, 2006). 
 
 
Contentious  Relationships 
 
Contention is the final practice that I will discuss in this study of how the NCL 
politicized consumption. According to Sidney Tarrow (1998, p. 2) contention, or 
what he calls ‘contentious politics’, occurs when collective actors confront ‘elites, 
authorities, and opponents’. Although Tarrow maintains that contentious politics are 
caused by shifting political opportunities, I use the concept to understand the 
challenges that the NCL confronted over its respective consumer tactics. This 
contention resulted in the transformation of the consumer tactics the NCL employed, 
which then changed the organization of the NCL itself. I specifically focus on the 
contentious relationships that developed between the NCL, business, the state, and 
organized labor. While these relationships did not advance into violent conflicts, they 
certainly involved power struggles over both production and consumption. Most 
significantly, these struggles over consumer tactics changed the way that the NCL 
politicized consumption. 
 
The NCL did not encounter contention from business or the state over the use of its 
white list or label; neither were legally defined as boycott tactics thus were not subject 
to the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. However, the AFL attacked the NCL’s white label 
because it felt the label was competing with and undermining the union label. The NCL 
did face opposition from the business and state over its legislative tactic. The NCL 
worked on securing a variety of legal labor protections for women and children as well 
as consumer protection laws at both the state and federal level. In this section I focus on 
one federal case that highlights the contention that surrounded the ways in which the 
NCL employed its legislative tactic. 
 
 
Muller v. Oregon 
 
Muller v. the State of Oregon set historical and legal precedent on a variety of issues. 
The basis of the case rested on defending the constitutionality of a statute in Oregon 
that limited the working hours of adult women to 10 hours per day. Muller, a laundry 
employer in Oregon, challenged this statute on the grounds that it violated the 14th 
amendment, which guaranteed ‘the right to purchase or to sell labor’. In an earlier case, 
Lochner v. New York (1905), the Supreme Court had used the 14th amendment against 
male bakers who were attempting to legally secure an eight-hour workday. But, the 
court also ruled in Lochner v. New York that the state could, with ‘reasonable restraint of 
action . . . impose in the exercise of the police power for the protection of health, safety, 
morals, and the general welfare’ (Brandeis & Goldmark, 1969, p. 9). While the judiciary 
did not believe that male bakers worked in conditions that were unsafe or dangerous to 
their morals and health, the NCL thought that it could use this clause from the Lochner 
decision to convince the courts that women’s health was negatively affected by working 
more than 10 hours a day. The NCL retained the legal aid of Louis Brandeis, the 
brother-in-law of League member Josephine Goldmark. Together, Brandeis and 
Goldmark embarked on creating a brief to establish with empirical data that there 
existed a ‘reasonable ground for holding that to permit women in Oregon to work in a 
“mechanical establishment, or factory, or laundry,” more than ten hours in one day 
[was] dangerous to the public health, safety, morals, or welfare’ (ibid., p. 10). 
 
The bulk of this brief consisted of international and national labor laws and medical 
reports that claimed working long hours was dangerous to the health and morals of 
women. Overall, these laws and reports were based on the biological or physical 
differences between men and women. For example, an 1888 report from the Maine 
Bureau of Labor Statistics claimed that ‘woman is badly constructed for the purpose of 
standing eight or ten hours upon her feet . . . [because of] the peculiar construction of 
the knee and the shallowness of the pelvis, and the delicate nature of the foot’ 
(Brandeis & Goldmark, 1969 p. 19). Testimony from the committee on a Shops Early 
Closing Bill before the British House of Commons in 1895 claimed that long hours of 
standing contributed to anemia and nervous debility in women and would make them 
more susceptible to other disease; one committee member argued that ‘it is not good 
for women to stand . . . at all really’ (ibid., pp. 30  31). Committee member Dr W. 
Chapman Griggs claimed that prolonged hours of work had a ‘grave effect upon the 
generative organs of women . . . a large number of these women are rendered sterile 
in consequence of these prolonged hours’ (ibid., pp. 36  37). 
 
The ‘scientific’ connection between women’s work and infertility was powerful 
evidence to support the League’s case as the reigning ideology of the time assumed 
that the most important role of women was as mothers and their most important duty 
was to nurture their children and care for their families. Protecting the reproductive 
health of women was at the same time protecting the family and the home. For 
example, the Nebraska Bureau of Labor and Industrial Statistics reported in 1901  
1902 that: 
 
certain kinds of work which may be performed by men without injury to their health 
would wreck the constitution and destroy the health of women, and render them 
incapable of bearing their share of the burdens of the family and the home. The State 
must be accorded the right to guard and protect women as a class against such a 
condition. (Brandeis & Goldmark, 1969, p. 19) 
 
Brandeis and Goldmark also presented evidence that long working hours for women 
would not only destroy the home, but also deprave the welfare of society in 
general. A report from the New York Bureau of Labor Statistics in 1900 suggested 
that: 
 
if a reduction in the hours of labor does promote the growth of a purer and better 
family life, it will unquestionably result in the production of greater material wealth on 
the part of the generation trained under its influence; nothing else in fact will so 
effectively diminish the vast number of criminals, paupers, and idlers. (ibid., p. 48) 
 
The completed brief by Brandeis and Goldmark numbered 113 pages, of which only 
two pages consisted of legal arguments (NCL, 1909; Vose, 1957, p. 128). The 
other 111 pages contained empirical data gathered by Goldmark. The brief, which 
came to be known as the ‘Brandeis brief’, was the first of its kind to be heard in 
front of the Supreme Court and gained historical significance as the first time the 
court recognized sociological data, or ‘facts’, as legitimate evidence. The Supreme 
Court was convinced by the evidence gathered by Goldmark, and ruled in favor of 
upholding the Oregon statute. The ‘cross-class maternalism’ of the NCL was fully 
supported by the Supreme court and is best captured by Justice Brewer, who 
delivered the opinion of Muller v. Oregon on 24 February 1908: 
 
That woman’s physical structure and the performance of maternal functions place 
her at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence is obvious. This is especially 
true when the burdens of motherhood are upon her . . .  as healthy mothers are 
essential to vigorous offspring, the physical well-being of woman becomes an object 
of public interest and care in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the race 
(1908, p. 6). 
 
The decision in Muller v. Oregon was an overwhelming triumph for the NCL. This ruling 
validated statutes on limiting the working hours of women in 19 other states (NCL, 
1909). The success of securing protective labor legislation for women convinced the 
NCL that it should concentrate more of its energies on promoting its legislative tactic 
rather than its list and label tactics. Although, as I discuss below, opposition from the 





    The relationship between the AFL and the NCL was tenuous at times, but for the most 
part cordial. Although the AFL and NCL never formed an alliance to work together, 
they did support many of the same issues, including the abolition of child labor, 
shorter working hours, and sanitary working conditions. The main point of contention 
between the two organizations centered on wages. Almost from its inception the AFL 
criticized the NCL’s white label tactic because it thought it only guaranteed sanitary 
working conditions, thus neglected working hours and wages. The AFL was of course 
ignorant on the issue of hours, but it was correct that the League’s label failed to 
stipulate wages. The AFL also complained that the NCL label was competing with the 
union labels of tailors and garment workers. At the AFL’s 23rd annual convention in 
1903 Samuel Gompers, one of the founders of the American Federation of Labor in 
1886, reported that he did ‘not believe that these consumers’ leagues have intended to 
work counter to the labor movement‘, but he was worried enough about the 
‘unintentional injury’ to the union label that he met with a member of the NCL to discuss 
his concerns. Gompers argued that the union label already guaranteed sanitary working 
conditions, thus there was no need for the NCL’s label. In fact, Gompers 
recommended that ‘well-meaning, philanthropic ladies,’ such as members of the NCL, 
would better serve the purposes of organized labor by joining union label leagues 
instead of organizing their own groups and creating their own labels. According to 
Gompers a member of the NCL assured him ‘that the issuance of the league’s label 
would be discontinued’ (Gompers, 1903, p. 1284).8 
 
The NCL did not discontinue its label in 1903, but it also did not include wages in the 
label’s standards, even after its members debated this issue among themselves. In 
1917 the NCL voted to continue its label campaign for a final ‘trial quarter’, but due to the 
development of two dilemmas, the NCL decided to discontinue its label tactic in February 
1918. According to a special memorandum on the label the first problem was that the strict 
labor standards its label represented were becoming too difficult to enforce due to the lack 
of ‘intelligent inspections’ of factories (NCL, 1918a). This, of course, was a problem that had 
long hindered the issuing of the label since its inception, but was compounded when the 
NCL attempted to implement its label tactic in the western United States. The NCL 
experienced difficulty establishing local leagues in the west, therefore the Label 
Committee could not mobilize league members in these states to inspect factories or 
promote the NCL label campaign. Furthermore, due to a lack of resources the NCL could 
not pay the expenses of League members of the East Coast to travel out west to 
guarantee factories wishing to use the label. 
 
The second, more immediate, reason cited by the NCL for discontinuing its label 
tactic was renewed opposition from the AFL. The AFL had questioned the purpose of 
the NCL’s label when it was created in 1899, fearing that a label endorsed by 
consumers outside of the labor movement would compete with the union label. This 
fear was realized in 1916 when the AFL instituted a strike against a Boston 
manufacturer that used the NCL label. The AFL warned that unless the NCL withdrew 
use of its label from this manufacturer that it would issue a boycott on the NCL’s label. 
Although the strike was settled favorably before such a boycott was established the 
AFL began to openly attack the NCL, claiming that employers hostile to organized 
labor were using the NCL’s label ‘as a cloak for their hostility’. The NCL did not attempt 
to deny this accusation and even admitted that it failed to withdraw use of its label to a 
factory in Newark after it had experienced a fire and strikes from workers. The NCL also 
conceded that it had ‘no way of knowing when manufacturers who use our label have 
first rejected the request of a union to have its label adopted’. Even though the ultimate 
goal of the NCL’s label tactic was to ameliorate the unfair working conditions of female 
and child workers it did not wish to antagonize organized male workers. ‘Our position is 
obviously untenable as friends of labor,’ claimed the NCL ‘if we persist in pushing our 
label as a rival to the label of the American Federation of Labor against the protests of 
union officials’ (NCL, 1918b, pp. 12). 
 
The NCL officially announced the end of its label tactic at a special council meeting 
on 8 March 1918. At this time the NCL council voted to end the label and 
amended its constitution by striking out Article II, Section 2, which had established the 
Label Committee. Kelley presented a draft of the letter to be sent to manufacturers 
using the NCL label informing them of the termination of the label campaign. 
Manufacturers were allowed 90 days to legally use up their present stock of NCL 
labels, but their label contracts would be terminated within 30 days and they were 
required to return their electrotypes of the label immediately. The council approved 
these stipulations. Interestingly, in the finalized letter sent to manufacturers no 
mention was made of the AFL’s protest to the NCL label. Instead, the NCL claimed 
that the reason for ending the label tactic was that the legal standards in many states, 
especially those regulating working hours, were now stricter than those required to use 
the label. Furthermore, the NCL stated that it believed its organizational interests and 
goals could ‘best be promoted through other means’ since its ‘label does not now 
perform the service for which it was originally devised’. This ‘other means’ was, of 





The end of the NCL’s label campaign signaled a strategic move towards changing 
the organizational methods through which consumers could now be mobilized. 
While the NCL continued to problematize consumption in terms of production and 
maintained its interest in protecting female and child workers, the voice of 
consumers was no longer expressed solely through their purchasing power, but 
through their capacity to make demands on the state. When the NCL ended its label 
campaign it relinquished its investigations of factories. It was now the duty of the state 
to investigate and guarantee the conditions under which goods were produced and 
consumers were now responsible for ensuring that the state protected workers 
through regulating labor practices, such as working hours, wages, working conditions, 
and child labor. 
 
When the NCL substituted legislation for its label tactic it did not identify consumers 
any differently. Indeed, the learning experiences that the consumer-citizen gained 
from involvement with the label tactic prepared her well for the lobbying work involved 
with the legislative tactic. The standards stipulated for issuing the NCL label taught the 
consumer-citizen to interact with state factory inspectors and health officials and 
become familiar with state labor laws. The consumer-citizen learned how labor 
regulations were implemented through investigating factories. She learned to draft 
reports from her empirical observations and incorporate data from government 
agencies, especially state labor bureaus. The experiences gained through working on 
the label campaign paved the way for several NCL members in actually becoming 
government employees, including state factory inspectors. According to Dirks, the 
move towards legislation reflected the success of the NCL’s label tactic: ‘they had won 
public recognition, control of or at least influence in governmental agencies, and 
provided a new generation of trained female reformers with jobs in these new 




1. This seems evident in the edited volume by McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald (1996) where they call for 
a synthesis of all three concepts. Few of the contributors in this volume actually analyze the interaction 
between all three levels of analysis, and the structure of the volume itself is clearly divided into three 
sections: one on political opportunities, one on mobilizing structures, and one on framing processes. The 
contributions, therefore, are divided between these concepts in such a way that one level of analysis is 
taken to explain the other two in each section. Sidney Tarrow (1998) is an exception. 
2. White lists and labels today are referred to as ‘buycotts’ (see Friedman, 1999, p. 11). 
3. Nathan’s experience was not unique. Many NCL members worked for state regulatory agencies. 
Before accepting the position of General Secretary of the NCL, Florence Kelley was appointed the State 
Factory Inspector in Illinois in 1895. Mrs Van Der Vaart, Secretary of the Illinois Consumers’ League, was 
appointed an agent for the Illinois Bureau of Labor Statistics (NCL, 1906, p. 75). Mary Dewson, a 
member of the Massachusetts Consumers’ League, was appointed to a commission created by the state 
of Massachusetts in 
1911 to investigate the wages of working women     her work would help secure the passage of a 
minimum wage law for women in Massachusetts in 1912 (Goldmark, 1953, pp. 137  138). Perhaps the 
League’s most famous member, Frances Perkins, was appointed Secretary of Labor by Franklin 
Roosevelt in 1932 (see Athey, 1965; Storrs, 2000). When the Michigan Consumers’ League was created 
one of the first things it did was obtain State Factory Inspection positions for two of its members (NCL, 
1903, p. 45). Securing these positions was critical, particularly when the NCL began to focus on its 
legislative tactic     after all, even if labor laws were passed someone had to make sure these laws were 
enforced. 
4. The fight to abolish child labor occupied a central platform in many women’s organizations at the time of 
this 
study, including the National Congress of Mothers, the General Federation of Women’s Clubs, and 
the National American Woman Suffrage Association. While these groups concerned themselves little 
with the issue of consumption, the NCL was able to popularize the way in which it problematized 
consumption by serving on the child labor committees of these women’s groups. According to Kelley it was 
through this cross organizational work that the NCL was able to secure a ‘hearing for the truth’ that ‘it is 
we who are the real employers of the children, we who buy the product of their labor’ in front of ‘audiences 
who would not have invited a lecturer directly upon the work of the League’ (NCL, 1903, p. 20). 
5. Working with Mr Lawrence Veiler, First Deputy Commissioner of the New York City Tenement House 
Department, the NCL helped to a secure stricter tenement manufacturing law in the state of New York in 
1904 (Goldmark, 1953, p. 125). Most of the 1904 provisions to the tenement manufacturing law 
stipulated more stringent licensing procedures. Perhaps the most significant change was that the owner of 
a tenement building was now responsible for securing a tenement manufacturing license for all of the home 
workers in his building and ensuring that the premise was sanitary. Furthermore, factory owners were 
required to register the names and addresses of home workers with the state commissioner of labor. They 
also had to procure the names and addresses of all persons diagnosed with contagious diseases residing 
in tenement houses from the department of health. Factory owners were prohibited from sending goods to 
be finished where such diseases were present (NCL, 1904, pp. 25  28). 
6. It is important to note that the NCL was not just a woman’s organization: men participated in the 
organization, 
generally in leadership positions. John Graham Brooks was President of the NCL from 1899  1915; 
Newton Baker, former mayor of Cleveland, was President from 1915  1923; John R. Commons was 
President in 1923. Furthermore, two Supreme Court Justices, Louis Brandeis and Felix Frankfurter, were 
both involved in the NCL. Brandeis was the brother in law of Josephine Goldmark. 
7. Interestingly, the NYC League did recognize that working class consumers were forced to shop at night 
after they finished their working days and therefore could not participate in its early closing campaign. 
In an attempt to accommodate this practice it adjusted its standards for placing retail establishments that 
catered to the working class exclusively or in conjunction with more upper class consumers on its white 
list (Nathan, 
1926, p. 34). 
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